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Abstract
Poincare´ held the view that geometry is a convention and cannot
be tested experimentally. This position was apparently refuted by
the general theory of relativity and the successful confirmation of its
predictions; unfortunately, Poincare´ did not live to defend his thesis.
In this paper, I argue that: 1) Contrary to what many authors have
claimed, non-euclidean geometries do not rule out Kant’s thesis that
space is a form of intuition given a priori; on the contrary, Euclidean
geometry is the condition for the possibility of any more general ge-
ometry. 2) The conception of space-time as a Riemannian manifold
is an extremely ingenious way to describe the gravitational field, but,
as shown by Utiyama in 1956, general relativity is actually the gauge
theory associated to the Lorentz group. Utiyama’s approach does not
rely on the assumption that space-time is curved, though the equa-
tions of the gauge theory are identical to those of general relativity.
Thus, following Poincare´, it can be claimed that it is only a mat-
ter of convention to describe the gravitational field as a Riemannian
manifold or as a gauge field in Euclidean space.
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* * * * *
Many scientists and philosophers have argued that the possibility
of non-Euclidean geometries contradicts Kant’s thesis that geometric
axioms are synthetic judgments a priori (Kant 1929, 1986). Accord-
ingly, it became a common place to assert that the general theory of
relativity, by revealing the non-Euclidean nature of physical space, re-
futed Kant’s doctrine on the transcendental nature of space. However,
Poincare´ (1952) sustained that geometry is a convention and cannot
be the object of any experience, but his point of view fall into obliv-
ion due to the commonly held belief that the Riemannian nature of
space-time is testable.
The plan of the present paper is as follows: In Section 1, a brief
historical introduction to the problem is given and then it is shown
that the existence of Riemannian geometry not only does not refute,
but confirms Kant’s doctrine. In Section 2, the geometric convention-
alism of Poincare´ is reviewed. Section 3 is devoted to the alternative
formulation of general relativity, as a gauge theory, given by Utiyama
(1956). Finally, Section 4 compares the ideas of Poincare´ and Einstein
on the physical nature of space following a text written by the latter
in 1949.
1 How can Riemannian geometry be
possible?
The argument that non-Euclidean geometries contradict Kant’s doc-
trine on the nature of space apparently goes back to Helmholtz (1995)
and was retaken by several philosophers of science such as Reichenbach
(1958) who devoted much work to this subject.
In a essay written in 1870, Helmholtz (1995) argued that the ax-
ioms of geometry are not a priori synthetic judgments (in the sense
given by Kant), since they can be subjected to experiments. Given
that Euclidian geometry is not the only possible geometry, as was be-
lieved in Kant’s time, it should be possible to determine by means of
measurements whether, for instance, the sum of the three angles of
a triangle is 180 degrees or whether two straight parallel lines always
keep the same distance among them. If it were not the case, then
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it would have been demonstrated experimentally that space is not
Euclidean. Thus the possibility of verifying the axioms of geometry
would prove that they are empirical and not given a priori.
Helmholtz developed his own version of a non-Euclidean geometry
on the basis of what he believed to be the fundamental condition for
all geometries: “the possibility of figures moving without change of
form or size”; without this possibility, it would be impossible to define
what a measurement is. According to Helmholtz (1995, p. 244): “the
axioms of geometry are not concerned with space-relations only but
also at the same time with the mechanical deportment of solidest
bodies in motion.” Nevertheless, he was aware that a strict Kantian
might argue that the rigidity of bodies is an a priori property, but
“then we should have to maintain that the axioms of geometry are
not synthetic propositions... they would merely define what qualities
and deportment a body must have to be recognized as rigid”.
At this point, it is worth noticing that Helmholtz’s formulation of
geometry is a rudimentary version of what was later developed as the
theory of Lie groups, which I will mention in Section 3. As for the
transport of rigid bodies, it is well known nowadays that rigid motion
cannot be defined in the framework of the theory of relativity: since
there is no absolute simultaneity of events, it is impossible to move all
parts of a material body in a coordinated and simultaneous way. What
is defined as the length of a body depends on the reference frame from
where it is observed. Thus, it is meaningless to invoke the rigidity
of bodies as the basis of a geometry that pretend to describe the real
world; it is only in the mathematical realm that the rigid displacement
of a figure can be defined in terms of what mathematicians call a
congruence.
Arguments similar to those of Helmholtz were given by Reichen-
bach (1958) in his intent to refute Kant’s doctrine on the nature of
space and time. Essentially, the argument boils down to the follow-
ing: Kant assumed that the axioms of geometry are given a priori and
he only had classical geometry in mind, Einstein demonstrated that
space is not Euclidean and that this could be verified empirically, ergo
Kant was wrong.
However, Kant did not state that space must be Euclidean; in-
stead, he argued that it is a pure form of intuition. As such, space
has no physical reality of its own, and therefore it is meaningless to
ascribe physical properties to it. Actually, Kant never mentioned Eu-
clid directly in his work, but he did refer many times to the physics
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of Newton, which is based on classical geometry. Kant had in mind
the axioms of this geometry which is a most powerful tool of New-
tonian mechanics. Actually, he did not even exclude the possibility
of other geometries, as can be seen in his early speculations on the
dimensionality of space (Kant 1986).
The important point missed by Reichenbach is that Riemannian
geometry is necessarily based on Euclidean geometry. More precisely,
a Riemannian space must be considered as locally Euclidean in order
to be able to define basic concepts such as distance and parallel trans-
port; this is achieved by defining a flat tangent space at every point,
and then extending all properties of this flat space to the globally
curved space (see, e.g., Eisenhart, 1959). To begin with, the structure
of a Riemannian space is given by its metric tensor gµν from which
the (differential) length is defined as ds2 = gµνdx
µdxν ; but this is
nothing less than a generalization of the usual Pythagoras theorem in
Euclidean space. As for the fundamental concept of parallel transport,
it is taken directly from its analogue in Euclidean space: it refers to
the transport of abstract (not material, as Helmholtz believed) figures
in such a space. Thus Riemann’s geometry cannot be free of synthetic
a priori propositions because it is entirely based upon concepts such
as length and congruence taken form Euclid. We may conclude that
Euclids geometry is the condition of possibility for a more general ge-
ometry, such as Riemann’s, simply because it is the natural geometry
adapted to our understanding; Kant would say that it is our form
of grasping space intuitively. The possibility of constructing abstract
spaces does not refute Kant’s thesis; on the contrary, it reinforces it.
But then, can the axioms of geometry be verified experimentally?
Let us see what Poincare´ had to say on that matter.
2 Can geometry be an object of expe-
rience?
This is the fundamental question put forward by Henri Poincare´, to
which his answer was that something as a “geometric experiment”
cannot be performed (Poincare´, 1952):
Think of a material circle, measure its radius and circum-
ference, and see if the ratio of the two lengths is equal to
π. What have we done? We have made an experiment on
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the properties of the matter with which this roundness has
been realized, and of which the measure we used is made.
Something similar would happen with astronomical observations.
For instance, Lobachevsky had suggested that it should be possible
to determine the curvature of the space we live in by measuring the
parallaxes of distant stars (Jammer, 1993, p. 149). But then Poincare´
pointed out:
What we call a straight line in astronomy is simply the path
of a ray of light. If, therefore, we were to discover negative
parallaxes, or to prove that all parallaxes are higher than
a certain limit, we should have a choice between two con-
clusions: we could give up Euclidean geometry, or modify
the laws of optics, and suppose that light is not rigorously
propagated in a straight line.
He then concluded: “It is needless to add that every one would
look upon this [second] solution as the more advantageous”. Poincare´
wrote his essay in 1898, when the utility of non-Euclidean geometries
in physics was still unknown. Evidently he was mistaken on this point:
fifteen years later Einstein showed that the geometry of Riemann is
more advantageous for the description of gravity.
Now the question is: why does Euclid’s geometry seem so natural?
Kant assumed that the basic axioms of this geometry (the only geome-
try known in his time) were given a priori, while Poincare´ saw the an-
swer in the natural selection, thanks to which “our spirit adapted to the
conditions of the outer world, adopted the most advantageous geome-
try for the species; in other words, the most comfortable1.” There is no
doubt that this geometry is most comfortable since it was accepted as
the natural one over two millennia, but Poincare´ never explained why
this was so. A Kantian, however, would argue that it is most comfort-
able because it is given a priori. In any case, Poincare´’s conclusion is
clear: “geometry is not true, it is advantageous”. Accordingly, it is
nowadays evident that Euclidean geometry is most comfortable to use,
except for the description of the gravitational field, for which the Rie-
mannian geometry is more advantageous. But is Riemann’s geometry
indispensable for this task? It is not, as I will show next.
1Underlined by H. P.
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3 General relativity as a gauge theory
With the general theory of relativity, Einstein successfully unified
physics with geometry. Space, combined with time in a single space
of four dimensions, was no longer a simple scenario for natural phe-
nomena, but acquired a fully dynamical role. Space-time, in Ein-
stein’s theory, is a curved space and its curvature is equivalent to a
gravitational field. Thus non-Euclidean geometry found an important
application in physics. Furthermore, general relativity made definite
predictions, and it therefore appeared that the non-Euclidean nature
of space could be an empirical fact liable to be verified.
What would Poincare´ have said on this point? Unfortunately, his
untimely death did not let him hear about the new theory of Einstein.
In order to defend his own point of view, he would surely have insisted
that the general theory of relativity simply implies that light rays do
not propagate along “straight lines” but in a more complicated way.
From the empirical point of view, it is perfectly equivalent to saying
that light moves along “null geodesics” in a curved space, as postu-
lated in the theory of relativity, or along a curved path in Euclidean
space: there is no way to distinguish by experiments between the two
possibilities, and therefore general relativity does not contradict the
conventionalism of geometry. In fact, every prediction of general rela-
tivity can also be interpreted as a phenomenon in a Euclidean space,
since all the classical tests can be ascribed to alterations of Newtonian
physics. The perihelion shift of Mercury could be due to a correction
in Newton’s law of gravity; the deflection of light rays may be a real
deflection produced by gravity; and the gravitational red-shift of light
is due to an actual loss of energy. Even the formation of black holes
does not relay on the geometry of space: it is perfectly consistent to
assume that light is strongly bent around a massive compact object,
to the extent that it cannot escape from it.
As for cosmology, the expansion of the Universe is predicted by the
dynamical equations of Friedmann that follow from general relativity.
However, it is known from the work of McCrea and Milne (1934) that
these same equations can also be obtained within the framework of
Newtonian mechanics; it is only a matter of interpreting the Newto-
nian variables in terms of their relativistic counterparts (see Bondi,
1960, Chap. IX, for a detailed discussion). Moreover, it is a notewor-
thy fact that present day observations are compatible with a Universe
that is spatially flat on the average; that is to say, light rays do not
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diverge or converge, as would be the case in a space with negative or
positive curvature, but they move in “straight” paths (actually, this
supports Poincare´’s thesis even further: there is no “sufficient reason”,
in a Leibnizian sense, for light rays to either diverge or converge in a
perfectly homogeneous and isotropic universe).
In order to do justice to Poincare´, let us imagine for a moment what
would have been of physics if Einstein had not lived. Without Einstein,
special relativity would have been formulated anyhow, since all the
basic ingredients of this theory were known at the beginning of the
last century; it would have taken only an ingenious mind to paste all
the pieces together. However, it is undeniable that general relativity
is the sole achievement of Einstein, since it is a totally original theory
with no more antecedents than the classic physics of Newton and the
geometry developed in the XIX century.
What would have been, then, of general relativity without Ein-
stein? The answer can be found in the wider context of what is
presently known as a gauge theory, a concept that appeared in the
fifties and turned out to be extremely important in theoretical physics.
With the formalism of gauge theory, it is possible to deduce the equa-
tions that describe an interaction on the sole basis of their symmetries;
in other words, symmetry determines dynamical laws! Gauge theo-
ries are based on two fundamental mathematical concepts developed
throughout the XIX century: abstract mathematical spaces and the
theory of continuous groups of transformations. Mathematicians dis-
covered that it is possible to define abstract spaces without resorting
to any coordinate system, and that these more general spaces have a
much more complex and interesting structures than the usual one of
three dimensions. Curved spaces of many dimensions, such as those of
Riemann, are only particular cases. In quantum mechanics, for exam-
ple, the state of an atomic system is described as a vector in Hilbert
spaces: a Hilbert space can have any number of dimensions, even
infinite, and the “coordinates” are complex numbers. On the other
hand, the theory of continuous groups of transformations was devel-
oped mainly by Sophus Lie. Continuous transformations in abstract
spaces generalize the concepts of rotations and translations of material
bodies according to rules of motion in usual space. The crucial point
is that a given generalized motion corresponds to a particular symme-
try invariance and can be described by a non commutative algebra,
forming a Lie group, which can be classified in well defined categories.
The theory of Lie groups has crucial applications in physics, partic-
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ularly in the description of fundamental interactions between atomic
particles. The basic idea is that the various states of an atomic system
are described by vectors in an abstract space, and that these vectors
can be transformed without altering the physics of the system, just
as the translation of a solid body does not alter its properties. The
essential point is that these transformations can be interpreted as
symmetry properties and the mathematical formalism permits one to
deduce all the equations that describe the interactions. Such a for-
malism was first used by C. N. Yang and R. L. Mills (1954) to obtain
the equations that describe nuclear interactions.
The idea put forward by Yang and Mills was generalized a year
later by Ryoyu Utiyama, in an article that had a great impact in the-
oretical physics. Utiyama (1955) showed that if the symmetry prop-
erties of a fundamental interaction are known in a given point of an
abstract space, then the dynamical equations of that interaction, valid
everywhere in the same space, could be deduced precisely. Utiyama’s
formalism is based on the theory of continuous Lie groups. Essentially,
if the group of transformations that does not alter the form of the in-
teraction is known locally, then it is possible to deduce the equations
that are valid globally. More specifically, Utiyama stated the problem
in the following form:
Let us consider a system of fields QA(x) which is invari-
ant under some transformation group G depending on pa-
rameters ǫ1, ǫ2, ...ǫn. Suppose that the aforementioned
parameter-group is replaced by a wider group G′ derived by
replacing the parameters ǫ′ by a set of arbitrary functions
ǫ′(x), and that the system considered is invariant under the
wider group G′.
Under these conditions, he showed that a new field A(x) can be
introduced and the new Lagrangian L′(Q,A) can be deduced from
the original one L(Q), together with the field equations. The idea is
that, given a Lie group with operators T̂a that satisfy the commuta-
tion relations [T̂a, T̂b] = f
c
abT̂c, the derivative of a field Q
A must be
generalized to ∂µQ
A
→ ∂µQ
A
− TAa BQ
BAaµ, with a new field A
a
α that
in turn defines a gauge field
F aµν = ∂µA
a
ν − ∂νA
a
µ −
1
2
fabc(A
b
µA
c
ν −A
b
νA
c
µ) , (3.1)
in terms of the structure constants of the Lie group, fabc.
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Gauge field theory has found its paramount application in the
Standard Model of elementary particles, a model that has been most
successful in describing nuclear and electromagnetic interactions. Ac-
tually, the model is the gauge theory associated to a combination of
three simple groups of transformations in an abstract space: SU(3),
SU(2) and U(1).
As for the general theory of relativity, Utiyama showed in his ar-
ticle of 1956 that it is actually the gauge theory associated to the
group of Lorentz transformations in Minkowski space. In fact, it is
clearly seen from the formulation of Utiyama that there is an equiv-
alence between the electromagnetic and the gravitational fields: the
electromagnetic field is a spin-1 field described by a tensor of rank 2,
and the gravitation field is a spin-2 field described by a tensor of rank
4. The gravitational field tensor, by a lucky coincidence, has precisely
the same algebraic structure as the Riemann tensor that characterizes
a Riemannian space of four dimensions.
Let us paraphrase Utiyama’s formulation in a more modern no-
tation using the language of differential geometry. The formulation
runs along the following lines. Given the Minkowski metric ηab =
(−1, 1, 1, 1) in flat space with Cartesian coordinates, define a tetrad
(also known as Cartan repe`re mobile or vierbein) eaα such that, at a
given point, the differential line element is2
ds2 = ηabe
aeb = gαβdx
αdxβ , (3.2)
where gαβ is the metric tensor and e
a = eaαdx
α is a one-form (see, e.g.,
Flanders 1963). Under an infinitesimal Lorentz group transformation,
the tetrad ea transforms as ea → ea+ ǫa b e
a, where ǫab = −ǫba. Next,
let QA be a tensor with A being an index refereing to a particular ir-
reducible representation of the Lorentz group. Then, for a Lagrangian
L(QA, ∂µQ
A) to be invariant under a “generalized Lorentz transfor-
mation” with ǫab(x), the partial derivatives must be substituted by
∂µQ
A
→ ∂µQ
A
− T Aab BQ
BAabµ , (3.3)
where T̂ab are the generators of the Lorentz group,
[T̂ab, T̂cd] =
1
2
f mnab cd T̂mn. (3.4)
2Utiyama used the notation ha
α
for ea
α
, but he did not recognize this as a tetrad.
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Then, according to (3.1), a new field is defined as
Rabµν = ∂µA
ab
ν − ∂νA
ab
µ −
1
2
f abkl mn(A
kl
µ A
mn
ν −A
mn
µ A
kl
ν ). (3.5)
Thus the field is described by the tensor Rabµν from which the
scalar R = eµae
ν
bR
ab
µν can be constructed. The next step is to take
det(eaα)R as the Lagrangian of the field, add to it the Lagrangian of the
matter-source, and, as explained in any text book of general relativity,
obtain the usual Einstein equations by varying with respect to gαβ.
Now, in the language of differential geometry, if eaα is identified
with a tetrad, then Aabα are the Ricci rotation coefficients (related to
the Christoffel symbols) and Rαβµν = e
α
ae
β
bR
ab
µν is the Riemann tensor
(see, e.g., Flanders 1963).
Just for the sake of comparison, recall that the electromagnetic
field Fαβ can be deduced as the gauge field of the Abelian group U(1):
Fαβ = ∂αAβ − ∂βAα, where the electromagnetic potential Aα plays
the same role as the Ricci rotation coefficients for the gravitational
field. The Lagrangian is taken as L = 1
4pi
FαβF
αβ , which is quadratic
in the field; unlike the case with the Riemann tensor, it is not possible
to construct a scalar from Fαβ that is linear on the field; this is an
important difference between the two fields.
As for the equations of motion for a test particle, these can be
obtained, in the case of an electromagnetic field, from the action∫
AµU
µdτ where Uµ is the four-velocity of the particle and τ its proper
time: the Lorentz force equation follows. For the gravitational field,
the action is of the form
∫ √
gµνUµUνdτ , and its variation gives rise to
the well known geodesic equations if gµν is interpreted as the metric
of a Riemannian space.
Looking the matter from a modern perspective, it can be ascer-
tained now that Einstein used an extremely ingenious logical reasoning
in order to develop a theory based on the formal analogy between the
equations of Riemannian geometry and those of a relativistic gravi-
tational field. Thus Einstein was four decades ahead of his time in
formulating what would be known as a gauge theory. If Einstein had
not had this insight, it would certainly correspond to Utiyama the
merit of formulating a fully relativistic theory of gravity.
The formulation of a gravitational theory by Utiyama does not
relay on a curved space, but rather on an abstract space that has the
same mathematical structure as a Riemannian space of four dimen-
sions. In this way he arrived to a basic set of equations that are iden-
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tical to those obtained by Einstein. Thus, Poincare´ would be perfectly
right in claiming that it is a mere question of convenience whether to
use one formulation or the other: there is no difference, from a purely
formal point of view, to use Riemannian geometry or gauge field the-
ory, although the elegant formulation of Einstein is more comfortable
and easier to visualize because it is based on a beautiful geometric
analogy.
4 An imaginary dialogue
Poincare´ and Einstein met only once, during the 1911 Solvay Congress
at Brussels, a year before the untimely death of the great French
mathematician. Poincare´ already knew about the special theory of
relativity, but he was not entirely convinced of it, although he had a
great esteem for his young creator. As for Einstein, who was usually
reluctant to acknowledge the contributions of his predecessors, it is
only on his later years that he mentioned Poincare´ as he deserved.
In 1949, Paul Schilpp edited a volume dedicated to Einstein with
several essays written by distinguished scientists and philosophers of
science (Schilpp 1949). In the final chapter, Einstein commented each
essay and, in particular, he took the opportunity to imagine a dialogue
between Poincare´ and Reichenbach on the geometric conventionalism
that the latter author had criticized in his essay. Einstein summarized
the antagonist positions in a simple and clear way: “Is a geometry —
looked at from the physical point of view— verifiable (viz., falsifiable)
or not? Reichenbach, together with Helmholtz, says: Yes, provided
that the empirically given solid body realizes the concept of ‘distance’.
Poincare´ says no and consequently is condemned by Reichenbach ”.
Next, Einstein imagined the following dialogue:
Poincare´: The empirically given bodies are not rigid, and
consequently cannot be used for the embodiment of geo-
metric intervals. Therefore, the theorems of geometry are
not verifiable.
Reichenbach: I admit that there are no bodies which can
be credited immediately adduced for the “real definition”
of the interval. Nevertheless, this real definition can be
achieved by taking the thermal volume-dependence, elas-
ticity, electro- and magneto-striction, etc., into considera-
tion. That this is really and without contradiction possible,
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classical physics has surely demonstrated.
Poincare´: In gaining the real definition improved by your-
self you have made use of physical laws, the formulation of
which presupposes (in this case) Euclidean geometry. The
verifications, of which you have spoken, refer, therefore, not
merely to geometry but to the entire system of physical laws
which constitute its foundation3.
At the end of the imaginary conversation, Einstein manifested his
agreement with Kant in so far as “there are concepts (as, for exam-
ple, that of causal connection), which play a dominating role in our
thinking, and which, nevertheless, cannot be deduced by means of a
logical process from the empirically given.” According to Einstein,
this was Kant’s most important contribution and not the belief that
“Euclidean geometry is necessary to thinking and offers assured (i.e.,
not dependent upon sensory experience) knowledge concerning the
objects of ‘external’ perception4”.
It is thus evident that Einstein was still convinced of the non-
Euclidean nature of space, but he was unable to give a convincing
argument against Poincare´ and only paraphrased him. There is no
doubt that Einstein believed that the curvature of space must be an
object of experience; nevertheless, it can be seen from the above dia-
logue he imagined, that he was quite aware that the problem is con-
siderably more difficult than what Helmholtz or Reichenbach thought.
Surely, his conviction was sustained on the fact that, during his life-
time, the only known form of unifying gravity and relativity was us-
ing the mathematical tool of Riemannian geometry. The development
of gauge theories and, particularly, the independent formulation of
Utiyama of the same relativistic theory of gravity (which Einstein did
not live to see), made it evident that Riemannian geometry is very
advantageous for the theory describing this fundamental interaction,
but, as Poincare´ would have said, it is a very convenient convention,
but a convention anyway.
The author is grateful to M. P. Ryan for stimulating discussions.
3Underlined by A. E.
4Underlined by A. E.
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